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Abstract
Search advertising and display advertising are two
major online advertising formats. Search advertising
emphasizes ads’ click-through effect. Advertisers only
pay when users click the link of their ads. Traditional
display advertising emphasizes ads’ impression effect.
Most display ads are charged based on the number of
views on the ads. Considering that most online ads
increase brand awareness (impression effect) and
directly promote sales (click-through effect), the notemphasized effect in search advertising or display
advertising actually has a significant impact on the
market outcome. However, these impacts have been
largely ignored. In this paper, we examine various
mechanisms in search and display advertising by
considering both ads’ impression effect and clickthrough effect. Interestingly, we show a seesaw
relationship between ads’ two effects in search
advertising. The advertiser whose advertisement has a
strong click-through effect benefits relatively less from
its impression effect. In display advertising, the realtime-bidding (RTB) mechanism considers both ads’
impression effect and click-through effect. It allows a
publisher to gain more surplus than that through a
static auction. However, we show that RTB is
associated with a high risk of market failure.

1. Introduction
Online advertising has grown fast to become the
leading advertising format. It’s estimated that internet
advertising will overtake TV advertising revenue in
2017 [1]. Search advertising and display advertising
are two dominant online advertising formats. Search
ads, done by the search engine, are usually placed to
elicit an immediate performance, especially for a click.
Advertisers only pay when users click the links of their
advertisements. So advertisers in search advertising
are always focused on the “click-through effect” of ads.
Most display ads, which are posted for publicizing a
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product or an upcoming event, are used to create
impressions. They are always charged based on the
number of views of the ads, so in display advertising;
ads’ impression effect is emphasized. Considering that
online ads do not only increase brand awareness
(impression effect) but may also directly promote
sales (click-through effect), the not-emphasized effect
in search advertising or display advertising, which
actually has a significant impact on the market
outcome, is largely ignored or covered by the shadow
of the other effects. In addition, under the trend of
customized advertising, a new technology, Real Time
Bidding (RTB), has been introduced into traditional
display advertising. That means, based on the big data
of online users’ information, more targeted ads are
delivered via advertisers’ RTB auction. RTB display
advertising, represented by DoubleClick, RightMedia,
has been growing so fast that the advertising spending
of American is expected to reach 9.03 billion dollars
by 2017, accounting for 29% of total display
advertising spending [2]. Compared with traditional
display advertising, it evolves from “slot buying” into
“impression buying”. This new model achieves brand
awareness as well as considers the ads’ customization,
and thus it combines two effects together and could be
regarded as the third advertising format combining the
traditional display advertising and search advertising.
What should be noticed is the different
mechanisms of the three advertising formats. The
fixed-price contract pricing scheme of traditional
display advertising has changed to the individualbased real-time auction in RTB display advertising.
This is also different from the static auction of search
advertising. Stimulated by the two effects and from the
perspective of different mechanisms in three
advertising formats, we expect to explore the impact
of ignored effect and examine if the newly introduced
technology is more advantageous than the former ones.
In this paper, we study the cases where two
advertisers compete for one advertising slot provided
by a search engine (search advertising) or a publisher
(display advertising). Click-through rate is a measure
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of the effectiveness of promoting sales, which is
labeled as the click-through effect. The more an ad
matches a user’s preference, the higher chance the user
has to click the link of the ad. Impression is often used
as a measure of increased brand awareness. Every
time an ad is displayed on a page, an impression has
occurred, even if the user never clicks on it. So we
assume there exists a constant impression effect each
time the ad appears on a page. In search advertising,
the rule of second weighted unit price is adopted to
select the winners. In RTB advertising, the rule of
second price auction is used. In traditional display
advertising, the first price auction is adopted.
Our research shows that the ignored effect will
incentivize advertisers to bid higher than when just
considering the main effect and will make all players
generate extra profit, especially for the platform.
Therefore, the platform has an incentive to broadcast
the ignored effect. Interestingly, two effects work in a
consistent direction with each other in display
advertising but keep a seesaw relationship in search
advertising. To answer the question of mechanism, we
find that the newly introduced RTB display
advertising is technically and economically advanced
for the platform, however, it still has the risk of system
collapse.
To the best of our knowledge, this research is one
of the first studies on the mechanisms of different
advertising formats based on two main effects of
online advertising. This work makes a contribution to
the understanding of online advertising by providing a
more comprehensive analysis of the feature and
generality of different formats and how they affect all
the players. It also makes a theoretical contribution to
the emerging RTB technology by exploring its auction
mechanism and bidding strategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Related literature is discussed in the next section. Then
we set our basic model for the whole paper. The
detailed analysis of search advertising and display
advertising is in the subsequent sections. After that, an
extension equilibrium analysis is offered. Finally, we
get our conclusions.

2. Literature
The studies on online advertising and related
works that we discuss in this paper, draw on three
streams of literature, the relationship between search
advertising and display advertising, the different
auction mechanisms used in online advertising, and
the new business model of RTB advertising.
On one hand, different advertising effectiveness is
emphasized in this paper. Bidders in search

advertising are always “performance advertisers” who
place ads in order to elicit an immediate performance,
whereas many display ads are placed by “brand
advertisers,” who are instead building awareness [3, 4].
However, advertisers could achieve two effects
simultaneously no matter which kind of advertising
format is adopted. Google and Ipsos MediaCT ran
over 60 search experiments in 2013 in hopes of
understanding how search ads affect brand awareness.
As part of the studies, 800 U.S. consumers participated
in the simulated-search scenarios. The study found
that search ads do in fact have a positive impact on
brand awareness which was published in 2014. At the
same time, Fulgoni and Mörn presented that online
display advertisements affected consumer behavior
and that there were latency effects between branding
effects and sales lifts even when click rates were
minimal [5]. Only a limited number of studies examine
the interaction between the two main effects and thus
inspired by the practical problem and theoretical
research, two effects are considered simultaneously in
this paper.
Our research is also relevant to the literature on
online advertising auctions. The mostly studied
auction in online advertising is the one that adopted by
Google. In 2002, Google started AdWords using
Generalized Second Price Auction (GSP) [6, 7] and
then added the ranking factor into its bidding. The
factor extended from CTRs at start-up to a more
comprehensive “quality score” by now [8]. In this
paper, the quality score is represented by CTRs for
simplification. Following Chen & Stallaert, our
research uses second weighted unit-price auctions to
sell slots and assumes auctions are under a completeinformation setting [9]. Unlike most studies which
focus on providing a better design of auctions in online
advertising, in this paper we make it as a given tool to
better understand the bidding strategy and its
implication to all players.
RTB, an emerging and promising practical
marketing technology, is attractive to researchers
recently. In limited papers relevant to RTB and from
the perspective of structure and players, the current
research topics could mainly be divided into three
parts [10]. Publishers and SSPs, as the supply side,
constitute the first perspective. In practice, publishers
usually sell premium ad inventory to high-quality
advertisers via contract negotiation on an abundance
of ad impressions to avoid default, the remnant ad
inventory is sold through RTB to get the best matches.
Hence how to allocate the different channels, how to
optimize reserved price, and how to make revenue
optimization are hot research questions. For instance,
Balseiro et al., considers the tradeoff between the realtime revenue with the long-time benefits of traditional
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reservation-based ad contracts, formalized the
combined allocation problem as multi-objective
stochastic control problem and designed an efficient
policy for online ad allocation [11]. Fridgeirsdottir et
al. determined the publisher’s optimal pricing in
display advertising faced with uncertain setting [12].
Contract to supply side, the second perspective is
advertisers and DSPs which are the demand side of
RTB. They are willing to bid and pay for the bestmatched ad impressions using the real-time auction.
Therefore, the bidding behavior and strategies are
appealing to researchers and attract intensive eyeball.
Balseiro et al. introduced the notion of a fluid meanfield equilibrium (FMFE) that is behaviorally
appealing and computationally tractable, and in some
important cases, it has a closed-form characterization.
The rational behavior of advertisers could be
approximated well in the context of budgetconstrained by FMFE [13]. Actually, DSPs are the
proxy of advertisers which play the intermediary role
between AD Exchange (AdX) and advertisers in RTB
market. Each DSP chooses the highest bids from
advertisers at first and then AdX picks out the highest
one from different DSPs, so there exists a two-stage
second price auction, and thus the selection of the
appropriate algorithms and the balance of revenue
between advertisers and DSPs are important issues to
DSPs. As mentioned before, AdX, as the most critical
component in RTB, is the marketplace where
publishers sell their ads inventory and advertisers buy
impressions via the auction mechanism. In this part,
the key research issue is mainly about auction
mechanism design. It has been proved that the optimal
mechanism is second price sealed bid auction.
However, there exists the problem of imperfect
truthful bids submitting by DSPs because of the twostage auction. In order to deal with this problem, a
mechanism called “optional second-price” (OSP)
auction is introduced which practically used by
Google DoubleClick[14]. Another mechanism named
“BIN-TAC” is also theoretically proved to be effective
[15, 16]. These papers are mostly related to the bidding
strategy of advertisers and the auction mechanism of
AdX. In order to focus on the research question, the
role of DSPs is ignored and thus the auction is
simplified to one-stage auction. Our research
contributes to this stream of literature by comparing
the different mechanisms adopted by different
advertising formats and how the promising newly
technology works.

advertisers match each user’s requirement to different
degrees, at the same time the users have different
preference to the advertisements which will result in
different clicking probabilities on ads.
A standard Hotelling model is suggested to
measure the fitness between advertisers and users.
Two advertisers, indexed by 𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴, 𝐵𝐵 , stand at the
opposite ends of the unit length [0,1] . Users,
normalized to one unit, uniformly distributed along the
line. The distance between a user and an advertiser
describes the degree of matching between them which
will be translated into different clicking probabilities.
The most targeted user for an advertiser is the one
whose location is the same with the advertiser. The
remaining users match the advertiser decreasing with
the distance. Therefore, assume 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 is the maximum
probability that the most targeted user clicks the ads
from advertiser 𝑖𝑖 . For the other users, the click
probability decays along the distance with decay factor
𝑟𝑟 . So a user located at 𝑥𝑥 from advertiser 𝐴𝐴 has the
expected click-through rates of 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 (1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)and𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 �1 −
𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑥𝑥)�from advertiser 𝐴𝐴, 𝐵𝐵 respectively.
Denote the unit value that advertiser 𝑖𝑖 derives from
each click is 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 . Then Advertiser 𝐴𝐴(𝐵𝐵) has the
expected value of 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 (1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)(𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 �1 − 𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑥𝑥)�)
from the user at 𝑥𝑥. These benefits coming from clicks
on the advertisement can be regarded as the “clickthrough effect”. 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 is their maximum expected value
from the most targeted user’s click. Any other user has
a discount value to advertiser 𝑖𝑖 by the distance, which
means the click-through effect decays with the degree
of matching. Opposite to that, the impression effect
has no relationship with the ads’ fitness. Each time an
ad is shown to a user, an impression occurs no matter
the user clicks it or not. Suppose the impression effect
is constant, the advertiser derives a value of 𝑠𝑠 from
each view.
Two advertisers have full information about each
other’s value, maximum clicking probabilities (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) and
also have good knowledge of each users’ preference
which means two advertisers know the location
information of each other. In addition to that, the decay
factor (𝑟𝑟 ) is common knowledge. Two advertisers can
optimize their utilities and take the best response. We
will use the same basic model setup to study three
advertising formats which have the different context,
pricing scheme, and auction mechanisms.

3. Model Setup

In search advertising, suppose there is one
advertising slot offered by the search engine. Each
advertiser bids for the chosen keywords of ads. The
search engine matches users’ queries with ads’

Considering two advertisers compete for one
advertising slot offered by a platform. Ads from two
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keywords and then assigns the ad slot to the advertiser.
The mechanism used by the search engine to sell
advertising slots is a second weighted unit-price
auction, which is the most widely adopted approach
based on Google’s algorithm. Advertisers bid on cost
per click (CPC) and the winner is chosen by their
expected ad payments based on the cost-per-click bids.
A quality score will be given to each potential ad to
measure the expected number of clicks. As clickthrough rate (CTR) is the most important factor
defining quality score and is highly correlated to the
latter, we use CTR to represent quality score for
simplification in this model. The expected ad payment
is the product of the bidded CPC and the quality score
/ CTR. The advertiser with the largest expected
payment wins the auction and pays the second largest
expected payment. In the case of two advertisers’
auction, the one who wins the auction will pay the
other one’s proposed payment.
According to the pricing scheme and payment rule,
advertisers pay only for clicks, not impressions. So in
search advertising, the click-through effect is the main
effect. Actually, the impression effect also plays a role
because of the display behavior on the search result
webpages no matter the user clicks it or not. However,
it hasn’t been charged by the search engine and is often
ignored in the previous papers. If the impression effect
is taken into account, the extra effect will influence
advertisers’ bidding strategies and then result in profit
changes for the search engine and two advertisers.
As in the basic model, suppose the impression
effect is s and two advertisers preset the bid price 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ,
each time the user 𝑥𝑥 clicks on the ads from two
advertisers, the advertisers are expected to pay
𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 (1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) or 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 �1 − 𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑥𝑥)� to the search
engine respectively. The marginal user 𝑥𝑥̅ who is no
difference to the search engine when bidding 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴 , 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵 is:
𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 (1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥̅ ) = 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 (1 − 𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑥𝑥̅ ))
𝑏𝑏 𝑞𝑞 −𝑏𝑏 𝑞𝑞 (1−𝑟𝑟)
𝑥𝑥̅ = 𝐴𝐴(𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴 𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵 )𝑟𝑟
𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 +𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵

With two advertisers’ bidding price, the search
engine segments the whole market into two parts. The
users in the interval [0, 𝑥𝑥̅ ] will be targeted to
advertiser 𝐴𝐴 ’s advertisement, which is 𝐴𝐴 ’s market
share; on the other hand, [𝑥𝑥̅ , 1]is the market share for
advertiser 𝐵𝐵 .
For advertisers 𝐴𝐴, 𝐵𝐵, their expected profits come
from three parts, the first one represents click-through
effect, the second is impression effect and the last one
is the expected payment of advertisers.
𝑥𝑥̅
𝑥𝑥̅
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = ∫0 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 (1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + ∫0 𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑥𝑥̅

− ∫0 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 �1 − 𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑥𝑥)�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
1

1

𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 = ∫𝑥𝑥̅ 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 �1 − 𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑥𝑥)�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + ∫𝑥𝑥̅ 𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

1

− ∫𝑥𝑥̅ 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 (1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
Lemma 1: Equilibrium bidding strategies are
𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴 = 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴 �1 +

𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵 = 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 �1 +

𝑠𝑠

�

1

2−𝑟𝑟 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵
𝑠𝑠

�

1

2−𝑟𝑟 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵

+

+

1

𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴
1

��

𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴

��

And the larger the impression effect, the larger the bid
which means the ignored impression effect will push
advertisers to bid higher to win the auction.
Lemma 1 also shows Advertisers’ optimal bids are
proportional to their values.
1) 𝑠𝑠 = 0 , 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 = 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 . If two advertisers do not
recognize the benefit of impression effect, or they
haven’t put the impression effect into consideration in
their bidding strategies, the advertisers bid their true
values. This result is consistent with the claims of
previous literature and can be regarded as the
benchmark case.
2) 𝑠𝑠 > 0 , 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 > 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 .When impression effect is
considered by two advertisers, the impression effect
pushes advertisers to bid higher than their values to
win the auction. The increased bidding values are
proportional to the benefit of impression effect and
affected by the click-through effects of both
advertisers as well.
Lemma 2: Impression effect will not affect the market
share/coverage of the two ads when impression effect
is constant to all visitors.
The location of the marginal user has not changed
with and without of the impression effect:
𝑏𝑏 𝑞𝑞 −𝑏𝑏 𝑞𝑞 (1−𝑟𝑟)
𝑣𝑣 𝑞𝑞 −𝑣𝑣 𝑞𝑞 (1−𝑟𝑟)
𝑥𝑥̅ = 𝐴𝐴(𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴 𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵 )𝑟𝑟 = 𝐴𝐴(𝑣𝑣 𝐴𝐴 𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵 )𝑟𝑟 = 𝑥𝑥̅ ′
𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 +𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵

𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 +𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵

If considering only the click-through effect, each
user has a different probability of making a
contribution 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴 , 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 to the search engine respectively.
For users in the left part[0, 𝑥𝑥̅ ′], they generate more
revenue when showing ads from advertiser 𝐴𝐴 rather
than𝐵𝐵; vice versa. In that case, the market shares are
determined by the search engine based on the marginal
user. No changes in market share when considering the
extra impression effect is very intuitive in that the
utility of impression effect is the same for two
advertisers so they have an equivalent increase in the
bidding price in equilibrium. And the market share is
positively related to its own click-through, but
negatively correlated to its competitors’.
Lemma 3: There is a seesaw relationship between
impression effect and click-through effect in search
advertising.
𝑠𝑠
1
1
Denote 1 +
�
+
� as 𝑀𝑀 . An
2−𝑟𝑟 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵

𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴

advertiser’s optimal bid is 𝑀𝑀 times of the value that
the advertiser gains from each click. The increase of
bidding price results from the extra impression effect.
From this sense, 𝑀𝑀 can be regarded as the multiplier
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of impression effect. From the mathematical
expression, on one hand, 𝑀𝑀 increases with 𝑠𝑠; on the
other hand, 𝑀𝑀 has a negative correlation with, 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴
and 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 , in which 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 can be seen as the indicator
of click-through effect for the advertisers. Therefore,
there is a seesaw relationship between impression
effect and click-through effect. If the click-through
effect is more important to the advertiser, the
impression effect
will
lower down and
correspondingly the increased degree of bids for the
slot is not that much.
Table 1 (see Appendix) summarizes the profits of
two advertisers and the search engine when
considering the impression effect or not.
Proposition 1: When considering the impression
effect in search advertising, the platform and two
advertisers share the increased profit. The platform
increases the higher profit percentage than two
advertisers and the advertiser whose advertisement has
a strong click-through effect benefits relatively less
from the advertisement’s impression effect.
From the analysis above, we can find that the
original profits of two advertisers without impression
effect are increasing with their own click-through
effect and decreasing with the opponent’s. This means
that when click-through effect is the only
consideration, the two advertisers compete on the
click-through effect and the one with the higher clickthrough effect gains a larger size market segment.
When impression effect is considered, the profit of the
platform (search engine) and two advertisers are all
increased, they share the increased surplus resulting
from the impression effect (Δ𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 , Δ𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 , Δ𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 > 0).
Δ𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 Δ𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 Δ𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
The increased percentage of profit ′ , ′ , ′
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵

𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃

which is positive to the unit value 𝑠𝑠 can also be viewed
as the result of the impression effect, among them the
platform increases the highest profit percentage
Δ𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
Δ𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆
(which is the sum of two advertisers ′ = ′ +
Δ𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵

𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃

𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

′ ) ) than two advertisers. Numerically, the platform
𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵
also increases up to 𝑀𝑀 times of 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ′ . The benefit
which results from higher bidding price is all directly
transferred into the platform, so it’s understandable
that the platform increases the same degree 𝑀𝑀 with the
bidding price. As for two advertisers, on one hand,
they benefit from the impression effect, on the other
hand, the payment also rises because of the opponent’s
higher bids, so the increased percentages of two
advertisers are lower than the platform. Another
interesting finding is that the increased percentage is
an inverse correlation to the click effect whereby the
platform is negatively related to both of advertisers’
click effects and each advertiser has a negative
relationship with its own click effect respectively.

That means there is a larger increased percentage for
an advertiser who has a lower click effect, so the small
advertiser will benefit more when considering the
impression effect. It’s proven that there is a tradeoff
between click effect and impression effect.
From the perspective of the platform, it has been
proven theoretically that the platform has incentives to
broadcast the impression effect accompanied with the
search advertising results, it will increase profit for all
the participants, especially for itself.

5. Display advertising
Display advertising is another important online
advertising format. This kind of advertising is done by
the web publishers who post the advertisement on their
websites. With technology improving, display
advertising has evolved from the traditional display
into real-time bidding display advertising. Although
the main purpose of display advertising is delivering
general advertisements or events to create or maintain
brand awareness, these two types have very different
mechanisms to show the ads.

5.1. Traditional display advertising
In traditional display advertising, advertisers
would purchase ad slots in bulk in a certain period of
time by making contracts directly with publishers. The
same ads with no target will be shown to all visitors.
The advertisers are charged based on the number of
views of the ads, therefore impression effect is the
main consideration for advertisers and publishers.
Even though it’s used mainly for awareness and
appearance, it has the probability to attract users’
interests, clicks, and even future buying.
Unfortunately, click-through effect is not frequently
considered in display advertising.
Suppose two advertisers compete for an appealing
ad slot on a website. The basic model setup still works
for display advertising. What should have been
noticed is the payment. It’s the first price auction
instead of second price auction in traditional display
advertising which means the publisher chooses the
advertiser with the highest bid to sell the ad slot.
Lemma 4 When only considering impression effect 𝑠𝑠,
two advertisers are both willing to pay s which is the
true value for the slot and get zero profit. So there is
no difference for the platform to assign the slot to any
advertiser and the profit of the platform is 𝑠𝑠.
′
′
𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
= 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵
= 𝑠𝑠

′
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

′
′
= 𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵
= 0, 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
= 𝑠𝑠
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When considering the benefit of click-through
effect in traditional display advertising, the new values
of two advertisers are respectively:
1
1
𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 = ∫0 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + ∫0 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 (1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
1

= 𝑠𝑠 + 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 (1 − 𝑟𝑟)
2
1

1

𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 = ∫0 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + ∫0 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 �1 − 𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑥𝑥)� 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
1

= 𝑠𝑠 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 (1 − 𝑟𝑟)
2
According to the rule of first price auction in
traditional advertising, if 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 > 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 , advertiser 𝐵𝐵
1
will not bid more than 𝑠𝑠 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 (1 − 𝑟𝑟) , so that
2
advertiser A only needs to bid a little more than 𝐵𝐵 to
1

win the auctions + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 �1 − 𝑟𝑟� + 𝜀𝜀; and if 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 >
2

1

𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 , 𝐵𝐵 will bid s + 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 �1 − 𝑟𝑟� + 𝜀𝜀 to be the
2
winner. The advertiser with higher click-through
effect will post a higher bid than 𝑠𝑠 and acquire extra
profit. The platform is expected to acquire more profit
1

s + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 �1 − 𝑟𝑟� + 𝜀𝜀 instead of 𝑠𝑠. At this time, two
2
effects work consistently with each other. This is in
contrast to the relationship in the search advertising.
If 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 > 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵
1
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = (𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 − 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 ) �1 − 𝑟𝑟� − 𝜀𝜀, 𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 0
1

2

𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑠𝑠 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 �1 − 𝑟𝑟� + 𝜀𝜀
2
If 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 > 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴
1
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 0, 𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = (𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 − 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 ) �1 − 𝑟𝑟� − ε
1

2

𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑠𝑠 + 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 �1 − 𝑟𝑟� + 𝜀𝜀
2
Lemma 5 When considering click-through effect in
traditional display advertising, the winning bid will be
higher. Hence, the platform is expected to acquire
more profit than s.

5.2. RTB display advertising
Under RTB display advertising, the ad slot would
be sold in real-time to the highest bidder based on each
individual impression via the auction mechanism. The
“slot buying” of traditional display advertising has
changed into “individual impression buying” of RTB
advertising, therefore users with different preferences
will be shown different ads. Although they both use an
auction mechanism to determine the winner, there is a
difference between search advertising’s keyword
auction and individual-oriented auction in RTB
display advertising. In the keyword auction, it is a onebidding action, while in RTB, the advertisers are
competing for each visitors’ impression. The second
difference among them is that it’s the advertisers
themselves who choose to take part in each auction

with RTB display advertising, but for other two
formats, the allocation is made by the platform.
RTB, which matches ads with users on an
individual basis, brings the chance to consider not only
the impression effect of the traditional display, but also
naturally takes users’ click-through action into
consideration. In that way, the bidding strategies of
advertisers will change accordingly.
Suppose two advertisers bid 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 , 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 for each
display opportunity. Click-through effects and
impression effects are denoted as the same as in the
model of search advertising. Following the literature
[9], when considering two effects simultaneously in
RTB advertising, we consider the weakly dominant
bidding strategies by the advertisers.
Lemma 6: In the interval of [0, 𝑥𝑥�] , advertiser 𝐴𝐴
always bids higher than advertiser 𝐵𝐵 , 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 > 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ,
bidding its total true value is advertiser 𝐵𝐵’s weakly
dominant strategy which is 𝑠𝑠 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 (1 − 𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑥𝑥)) ;
opposite to that, in the interval [𝑥𝑥�, 1], advertiser 𝐵𝐵 bids
higher than advertiser 𝐴𝐴 , 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 > 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 , and
advertiser 𝐴𝐴’s weakly dominant strategy is bidding its
true value 𝑠𝑠 + 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 (1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟).
When advertisers auction off each impression to
show ads to individuals, the bids stem from two parts:
the part of s is completely transferred from
impression effect into the bid, which means the
impression effect doesn’t influence the bids in RTB
display advertising. The other part coming from the
click-through effect, is the expected value of one click.
Or it could be viewed as the total value 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
discounted by the distance, so the more precise the
user matching the advertiser, the higher the
advertiser’s bid to the user.
Lemma 7: When considering two effects in RTB
display advertising, it achieves the same market
segmentation with that in search advertising, although
they have different auction mechanisms.
The marginal user in RTB display advertising
𝑣𝑣 𝑞𝑞 −𝑣𝑣 𝑞𝑞 (1−𝑟𝑟)
is 𝑥𝑥� = 𝐴𝐴(𝑣𝑣 𝐴𝐴 𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵 )𝑟𝑟 . The marginal user is the same
𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 +𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵

as that in search advertising. In search advertising, the
search engine assigns the users according to the
advertisers’ bids multiplied by the click-through rates.
In RTB, the two advertisers bid based on each user’s
characteristic. Although they have different paradigms,
they bring out the same segmentation results.
The profits of two advertisers and the platform
when considering two effects, are:
𝑥𝑥̅
𝑥𝑥̅
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = ∫0 𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + ∫0 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 (1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑥𝑥̅

− ∫0 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
1

1

𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = ∫𝑥𝑥̅ 𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + ∫𝑥𝑥̅ 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 �1 − 𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑥𝑥)�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
1

− ∫𝑥𝑥̅ 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

3930

𝑥𝑥̅

1

𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = ∫0 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + ∫𝑥𝑥̅ 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
Lemma 8 If impression effect is the only effect taken
into account in RTB display advertising, two
advertisers will have the same bids, which equal to the
value of the impression 𝑠𝑠. Consequently their expected
profits are zero from each auction. The platform’s
expected profit is 𝑠𝑠.
If only impression effect is considered in RTB
display advertising, the equilibrium outcome is the
same as that in the traditional display advertising.
Proposition 2 When considering two effects in RTB
display advertising, the bidding price increases , the
platform and two advertisers all generate extra profit
compared with the case when only considering the
impression effect. What’s more important, the
advanced advertiser with higher click-through effect
benefits more than the one with lower click-through
effect.
When comparing the bidding strategy and the
profits without and with click-through effect under
RTB (see Table 2 in Appendix), the extra effect pushes
two advertisers to bid aggressively than before. The
bids are not blind but correlated to users’
characteristics and click-through effect. Furthermore,
the increased payments which result from the
increased bids by advertisers benefit the platform. The
platform and two advertisers all acquire increased
profit and thus achieve Pareto improvement because
of the ignored click-through effect (∆𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 , ∆𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 , ∆𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 >
0). As a consequence, when the platform uses RTB,
the ads are forced to be targeted. The targeting makes
the click-through effect intensively added on the
impression effect which results in higher bidding price
and then more profits for the platform and advertisers.
It forms a dynamic loop from ads targeting to bids and
leading to profit. Another notable thing is the
increased profit of each advertiser is positively related
to its own click-through effect and inversely related to
the opponent’s, so it’s more beneficial to the advanced
advertiser with higher click-through effect than the
advertiser with the lower one. And for the platform,
it’s understandable to recognize the consistent
direction of two effects which is in contrast to the
inverse correlation conclusion in search advertising.
RTB- Combination of two advertising formats
Corollary 1: An interesting finding is that RTB is a
perfect combination of search advertising and
traditional display advertising, which only considers
their main effects, or it could be said RTB is a perfect
combination of two effects.
From table 3 (see Appendix), it can be seen that the
platform and two advertisers’ profits under RTB are
the sum of the profits in search advertising without
impression effect and the profits in traditional display

advertising without click-through effect. That means
the newly introduced RTB technology considers and
combines two effects perfectly. Different advertising
formats have the tendency towards integration.

6. Comparison of different advertising
formats under two effects
When considering two effects in three advertising
formats, the extra effect will stimulate the advertiser to
bid higher than when just considering one effect.
However, from the perspective of mechanism design,
search advertising and display advertising are
essentially different. In search advertising, advertisers
preset the bidding price for keywords and then the
search engine allocates the ad placement to two
advertisers which is a one-shot action. As to traditional
display advertising, the publisher allocates the ad slot
to only one advertiser. The principle is getting all or
nothing at all. In RTB display advertising, advertisers
themselves decide to auction for each user impression
which is a dynamic behavior.
Lemma 9 From the angle of the platform, the profits
are all increased under three cases when considering
two effects, but 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 > 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 > 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 .
First prove 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 > 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 . In search advertising, the
extra profit from impression effect is shared by all
players, including two advertisers and the search
engine, but in RTB display advertising, the platform
acquires the total profit which is completely
transferred, not only from the impression effect but
also from the click-through effect (Corollary 1). This
means, using RTB auction, based on individuals, is a
more beneficial way to improve profit compared with
the classical static auction in search advertising. RTB
changes the auction mechanism in online advertising,
and it allows the platform to gain more surplus than
that through a static auction.
Then we compare the profits in two display
advertising formats and can prove 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 > 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 .
Actually, it’s the first price auction in traditional
display advertising, but a variant of the second price
auction in RTB which results in platform’s lower
profit. It’s reasonable to understand that the premium
inventory of display advertising is still using
traditional advertising, and the remnant inventory is
using RTB.
As for advertisers, the results are inversed under
three formats 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 < 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 < 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 . In traditional display
advertising, the advertiser’s profit is either o or very
small, in RTB the advertisers share the part of profit
coming from the click-through effect, and in search
advertising they also share the part of profit from the
impression effect, which results in a more total profit
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than that in RTB display advertising. As a whole,
search advertising is more beneficial to advertisers
than display advertising.
Proposition 3: RTB completely changes the auction
mechanism in online advertising, and it allows a
platform to gain more surplus than that with a static
auction, but it still has some weakness compared with
the traditional display advertising. From the
perspective of advertisers, it’s better for them to
choose search advertising rather than display
advertising. (see Table 4 in Appendix)

matched to exactly one advertiser will be sold at their
reserve prices (may be zero). This significantly
reduces the revenue of AdXs and DSPs, who as a
result have no incentives to segment their target
audiences via big-data analysis. In literature, it has
been empirically proven that the average price of
impressions first rises and then drops with market
segmenting. It could be found that the weakly
dominant equilibrium in Part 5.2 is an ideal result for
all parties, there are still possibilities of disappointing
consequences. Measures, such as reserved price needs
to be introduced to avoid systemic collapse.

7. Extension about the equilibrium results
8. Conclusion
When considering two effects in RTB display
advertising, the weakly dominant strategy is rational
and of great significance. Two advertisers bid for each
impression to show ads on the ad slot, as a result, the
whole market is segmented into two parts. In the part
that is more correlated to 𝐴𝐴’s ads, advertiser 𝐵𝐵 bids its
true value which is similar to the result in the private
second-price auction. Advertiser 𝐴𝐴 only needs to bid
higher than 𝐵𝐵’s true value and will win the auction. So
for the platform, the bid of the advertiser with smaller
click-through effect is equal to the lower bound of the
bids. This weakly dominant equilibrium looks perfect
for all the parties including the platform and two
advertisers. However, the equilibrium which we get in
the former analysis is just one of equilibriums, it’s not
a general equilibrium. From the general equilibrium,
we find that it may bring out system collapse due to
the low bid of the opponent.
Lemma 10: In the interval [0, 𝑥𝑥�] , the equilibrium
bidding strategies of two advertisers are
{(𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 , 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 )|𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ∈ �𝑠𝑠 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 �1 − 𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑥𝑥)�, +∞�,
𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ∈ [0, 𝑠𝑠 + 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 (1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)], 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ≥ 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 }.
Advertiser 𝐴𝐴 always bids higher or at least equal
to advertiser 𝐵𝐵 ( 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 > 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ), and thus advertiser 𝐴𝐴
wins the auction. Under this situation, advertiser 𝐵𝐵 has
a possibility of bidding a low price (maybe zero) to
give up the auction. Follow the same logic, in the
interval[𝑥𝑥�, 1], advertiser 𝐵𝐵 bids higher or at least equal
to advertiser 𝐴𝐴 and wins the auction, in that case,
advertiser 𝐴𝐴 may have no incentive to take part in the
auction.
According to the equilibrium strategies above,
although RTB can help to increase the accuracy and
efficiency of ads delivery, it may result in a situation
where it decreases the advertisers’ competition in an
auction and even leads to system collapse. This
situation is demonstrated in practical. For instance,
empirical research shows that most impressions sold
in Microsoft AdECN platform can only be matched to
one to three advertisers. Those impressions that are

In search advertising, click-through effect is
emphasized for its effectiveness and tractability; but in
display advertising, players usually focus on the
impression effect. In this paper, we pick up the ignored
effect in different advertising formats. It’s found that
the extra effect will push advertisers to bid higher than
when just considering one effect, and the profits of all
players, including the platform, increase. An
interesting seesaw relationship between click-through
effect and impression effect is illustrated in search
advertising. The advertiser with lower click-through
effect gains a smaller market segment through auction,
but receives more compensation when impression
effect is taken into consideration in the auction.
However, in RTB display advertising, the advertiser
with higher click-through effect will benefit more by
considering both effects. To sum up, from the
platform’s perspective, it’s necessary to point out the
previously ignored effect which may provide an
increased profit.
From the view of mechanism design, the
introduction of RTB is economically advanced. The
individual based real-time auction mechanism makes
it a perfect combination of two effects and produces
the roles of two advertising formats, so that it allows a
platform to gain more surplus than that through a static
auction. However, it still has some weakness and may
have the risk of system collapse.
As one of the first papers to explore ignored
advertising effect in online advertising, our study has
several limitations that future research could address.
First, we use Hotelling model to describe the bidding
competition between two advertisers. It will be
interesting to examine the bidding strategies by three
or more advertisers, and whether the similar results
remain satisfied. Second, this research has not
considered the reserved price mechanism, which is
prevalently adopted in online advertising auctions.
Furthermore, this paper provides theoretical
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equilibrium outcomes under the three online
advertising formats. It would be better to empirically
examine the results with real data.
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Appendix

′
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
(𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 )

′
𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵
(𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 )
′
𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
(𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 )
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